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jury Selection in an Aging
America: The New
Discrimination?
A fresh look at the judicial system
reveals the possibility that entrenched
stereotypes of the elderly may be work-
ing to drive discriminatory laws, poli-
cies, and practices that serve to disen-
franchise them of their right to partici-
pate in the judicial system by serving as
jurors.
By Max B. Rothman,
Burton D. Dunlop, and
Gretchen M. Hirt
- . arious countries, particularly the
United States, are beginning to
acknowledge the increased diversity,
vitality, and longevity that character-
ize the older population. In response,
employers, health care providers, various govern-
mental agencies, family members, and older adults
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are beginning to rethink entrenched stereotypes
and attitudes about aging. It is not surprising then
that the justice system must do the same.
This article expands on issues initially
addressed by Pamela Entzel, Burton D. Dunlop,
and Max B. Rothman in Elders and Jury Service: A
Case of Age Discrimination?' Entzel, Dunlop, and
Rothman review elders' perceptions of the judicial
process, their participation in civil and criminal
jury panels, and the relationship between older cit-
izens and the justice system. Evidence strongly sug-
gests that people age sixty-five and over face dis-
crimination throughout all phases of jury selec-
tion-from summons to the venire to final empan-
elling. This is detrimental to not only older persons
but also the parties to lawsuits and society as a
whole.
By the late 1990s there were approximately
34.1 million Americans over the age of sixty-five,
accounting for 12.7% of the total population.2
Current projections are that individuals age sixty-
five and older will comprise 20% of the popula-
tion by 2030, possibly exceeding 70 million in
number. The older population also is expected to
become dramatically more diverse between 1997
and 2030: white, non-Hispanics sixty-five and
over will increase by 79%, while those of Hispanic
descent will expand 368%. Black, non-Hispanic
elders are projected to grow in number by approx-
imately 134%, and Asians and Pacific Islanders by
354% .3
As the number of older people in American
society increases, so does the probability that many
will be summoned to jury service. A growing num-
ber of states have modified their jury selection sys-
tems by broadening the pool of potential jurors
from registered voters to those with a valid driver's
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license. This responds to concerns that juries had
been, among other things, "too old."4 Older citi-
zens are predominantly a non-working group,
making them less likely to seek work-related
excusals frequently sought by younger individuals.'
Furthermore, although grandparents increasingly
are raising grandchildren, fewer older Americans
are engaged with childcare responsibilities, a cir-
cumstance that may prevent a substantial number
of younger persons from fulfilling jury service duty.
On the other hand, elders do serve as caretakers for
spouses or parents, creating a potential conflict
with jury service.
Several studies suggest that older citizens are
well-represented on jury panels and that, as dis-
cussed below, most Sixth Amendment cases involve
criminal defendants arguing that their constitution-
al rights were violated by having too few individu-
als in the loosely and variously defined category of
young adult.' Nonetheless, in contrast to the argu-
ment that older adults are disproportionately rep-
resented on jury panels, other evidence suggests
that older Americans are too frequently intimidat-
ed by, and not accommodated in, the judicial
process. Research indicates that at least twenty-one
states provide older citizens with exemptions from
jury duty, offering individuals the opportunity to
avoid a summons if they meet an arbitrary age
threshold.7 Indeed, the individual using an exemp-
tion may not be required to proffer any evidence of
disability or infirmity that would interfere poten-
tially with that person's ability to serve effectively
or comfortably as a juror.
Exemptions and Excusals
Federal courts do not offer age-based exemptions
or excusals from jury service. Of the twenty-one
states that do so, most limit eligibility to individu-
als over age 60. For example:
" Wyoming uses a cut-off age of seventy-two.'
" Nevada added an exemption in 1997 for all
individuals over age sixty-five who live sixty-
five or more miles from the court.
" New Jersey does not automatically exempt its
elder citizens from jury service, but allows
age-based excusal for individuals age seventy-
five or older.'
Courts assess the validity of excusals on a case-by-
case basis, thus differentiating them from exemp-
tions available to all eligible jurors who claim or
seek them. '°
California has an unconventional method of
handling older potential jurors. Individuals age sev-
enty and over with certain physical or mental limi-
tations may request excusal from jury service on
disability-related grounds-although, inexplicably,
persons claiming such a disability-related excusal
cannot be required to provide proof to the court."
Minnesota and Florida offer a flat-out, age-based
exemption for all citizens over age seventy.
However, in all states honoring age-based exemp-
tions, older potential jurors are not denied the right
to serve on juries after reaching the legislatively
determined age threshold, but are instead afforded
the opportunity to avoid service, an option that
only they may exercise. 2
In contrast, elder jurors have not been called for
service or have been summarily excluded in some
jurisdictions.13 In Williams v. State,14 court proceed-
ings revealed that a jury commission clerk excluded
all persons over the age of sixty-five from the jury
roll pursuant to an age-based exemption that
Alabama then had in place. In People v. McCoy," a
California state appellate court found that officials
at the trial court level routinely excluded potential
jurors age seventy and over from the jury pool
before receiving excusal requests.
Rationales
Dicta, legislative committee hearings, or other
sources that explain why senior citizens require
specially crafted exemptions and excusals from
performing their civic duty as jurors are difficult to
find. A 1986 book, Anatomy of a Jury: The System
on Trial, presents a credible theory regarding the
use of exemptions for elders. Its author opines that
society is proceeding on the assumption of disabil-
ity and senility in individuals of a certain age
group.' 6 Entzel and colleagues note that, "states
have argued (and courts have agreed) that exemp-
tions are reasonable in light of increased rates of
'infirmities' among older people."' 7 While older
people are more likely to suffer infirmities, disabil-
ity levels not only vary enormously among older
individuals, but rates of disability among this
group have dropped significantly in recent years.
Relying on assumptions and stereotypes relat-
ing to the condition of elders detracts from repre-
sentativeness and eliminates vigorous, capable indi-
viduals from offering a valuable service and glean-
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ing rewards from participation in the judicial sys-
tem. 18 In fact, older potential jurors may seek
exemption or excusal from jury duty at least in part
because they perceive that a state's offer of an
exemption or excusal is an implicit request that
they not be present.
Perceptions
A survey of Florida residents age sixty-five and
over who had been summoned for jury service eval-
uated perceptions of the jury selection process. 19
Individuals who were summoned and did report as
well as those who were summoned and did not
report were questioned. Survey results found no
variance between the two groups in their percep-
tion of the importance of participating in the jury
process: they overwhelmingly agreed that it is
important to the functioning of a democracy.
Despite their agreement regarding the value of jury
service, however, a significant number of study par-
ticipants did not report for jury service. Less edu-
cated, older, and more infirm citizens were more
likely to have failed to report for jury duty in the
past, and to indicate that they would make the
same decisions again if requested to report in the
future."
Service by elders on a jury panel provides not
only an opportunity to make a valuable contribu-
tion to the community, but also has ramifications
for the accused in a criminal case. Under the Sixth
Amendment, defendants are entitled to an impar-
tial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the com-
munity. Common sense dictates that not every jury
must contain representatives of all groups in a com-
munity; rather, no group should be systematically
excluded during the jury selection process.
However, it appears that older adults are being
excluded, quite intentionally, from the jury selec-
tion process, not just in criminal cases but civil tri-
als as well. Questions regarding the constitutional-
ity of this practice are surfacing more frequently.21
Unlike virtually any other distinction made
during the jury selection process, there is no height-
ened judicial scrutiny under a traditional equal pro-
tection analysis when aged-based exemptions,
excusals, and peremptory challenges are encoun-
tered. In that context it is intriguing that courts
recently have determined that peremptory chal-
lenges based upon race, gender, and religion violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nonetheless, some have argued that
eliminating people from the jury process through
age-based exemptions or peremptory challenges
reduces the representativeness of the jury panel and
thus runs counter to the fair cross-section ideal as
well.22
Perhaps the use of peremptory strikes to elimi-
nate older jurors is more insidious than exemption.
At least a potential juror must affirmatively request
to be excluded from the process in the case of
exemptions and excusals. Alternatively, lawyers use
peremptory challenges to eliminate unfavorable
jurors-those who would not, based upon stereo-
types, prejudices, and firmly entrenched presuppo-
sitions of the legal community and society as a
whole, be sympathetic to claims by the side exer-
cising the strike. Elders are by no means the only
group to be peremptorily challenged based on pre-
conceived notions of their attitudes; however, there
is to date no legal protection from the use of this
practice against them.
Implications of a Discriminatory Legal
System
A recent informal survey of trial attorneys in the
South Florida area conducted by one of the authors
revealed a surprising willingness to admit discrimi-
natory practices against various groups, most
notably, older potential jurors. Opinions about
older jurors were varied, of course, with two attor-
neys expressing no preconceived notions about the
way a particular person would vote on a jury based
solely on that individual's age. Several lawyers
questioned were adamant that use of the term older
juror was insufficient, and that there was a definite
disparity among the old. After completing the sur-
vey, it was evident that lawyers viewed people in
the sixty to seventy age range as having "wisdom,"
while those over seventy were considered a hin-
drance on the jury panel. As one former public
defender now in private civil practice remarked, "I
would question their [persons over seventy] capac-
ity to serve."
Several criminal defense attorneys justified
their feelings about older jurors by citing personal
experiences. One attorney expressed dissatisfaction
with the attentiveness of older jurors, while anoth-
er asserted that older people were more prejudiced
and conservative. Finally, there was overwhelming
agreement that older potential jurors expressed lit-
tle sympathy for criminal defendants, particularly
those who were convicted of drug-related charges.
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These same attorneys claimed that young adults,
around twenty-five to thirty were less likely to con-
vict on drug-related charges, while older jurors
held stronger beliefs regarding the necessity of
incarceration for drug-related offenses.
Stereotypes that attach to the old likewise affect
the very young. A public defender revealed that he
was very likely to strike individuals under the age of
twenty-five because "they don't have enough life
experience." Several attorneys based their opinions
of the young on courtroom experiences; most cited
dissatisfaction with their attention span, as well as
their lower levels of interest in trials.
Interestingly, plaintiffs' attorneys demonstrated
a prejudice in favor of older jurors, especially when
seeking money damages for injuries, or pain and
suffering. Moreover, one civil defense lawyer
explained that he used his peremptory strikes to
remove virtually all older jurors from the panel in
a case involving condominium controversies. His
justification rested on a belief that elders would be
sympathetic to the positions held by the condo-
minium association (comprised of predominantly
older individuals), while the very young would find
the claims "petty and ridiculous."
Results from this small, informal survey are
consistent with findings of several other
researchers, as well as the American Bar
Association (ABA). For example, one commentator
describes the process by which undesirable jurors
are eliminated as a highly unscientific mixture of
preconceived notions, hunches, intuition, biases,
and stereotypes about aging and older people.23
The ABA stated that peremptory strikes are used
against older potential candidates for the panel
because attorneys view elders as "stubborn, indeci-
sive, or cantankerous."24
Judges have written on the subject as well, with
one even arguing that older jurors are less receptive
to new ideas and information than the young." A
statement intended to direct jury selection in civil
cases notes that older jurors generally are more tol-
erant of human frailty and more sympathetic to the
injured than younger jurors and, at the same time,
"tend to have more respect for authority and more
prejudices than younger jurors," with particular
contempt for "single persons and the young."26 In
a commentary on complex litigation, E Lee Bailey
argues that "jurors who are between twenty-eight
and fifty-five years of age ... will tend to be most
alert and receptive. "27
Not surprisingly, based on the literature
reviewed above, attorneys appear almost eager to
offer age as a justification for strikes where asser-
tions are made that improper racial or gender bias-
es motivated the striking of a juror.28 In Smith v.
State,29 the defense questioned the prosecution's use
of peremptory strikes to eliminate four black mem-
bers of the venire. The prosecution retorted that
two black prospective jurors were eliminated not
on the basis of their race, but because they were
old. The fact that a white venireperson (almost ten
years the senior of one of the struck black potential
jurors) was not eliminated from the jury pool
brings into question the veracity of that claim. In
effect, then, a lawyer is covering an insidious and
unconstitutional discriminatory practice based
upon race, with an acceptable prejudice against the
old. In addition to demonstrating the willingness of
lawyers to acknowledge age-based discrimination,
this and other similar cases reveal a judicial will-
ingness "to accept age-based discrimination even
while purporting to scrutinize motions for discrim-
ination on other grounds.""
Misconceptions surround the legitimacy and
accuracy of jury selection procedures that rely on
hunches, intuition, or other popularly accepted
methods. Empirical studies illustrate that trial
lawyers who use assumptions or biases to predict
the attitude of a particular class of jurors consis-
tently fail to select individuals who would favor
their side.31 In fact, a number of well-designed stud-
ies find a correlation between demographic charac-
teristics and verdict preferences to be negligible at
best, with information regarding jurors' attitudes
revealing far more about the selector's preexisting
biases than those of the selectee.32
Recently, three states have effected rules relat-
ing to discriminatory practices of attorneys against
prospective jurors. Florida, Illinois, and Rhode
Island now have regulations explicitly prohibiting
discrimination on racial, gender, and other regular-
ly cited grounds. However, only Florida added age
to its list of protected classifications. This bar on
discriminatory practices does not explicitly apply
to peremptory challenges, except in the District of
Columbia, which prohibits strikes based on "race,
religion, national origin, background, or sex," but
not age. 3 Many judges, academics, and legal prac-
titioners encourage the outright eradication of
peremptory challenges.' One judge argues that in a
post-Batson era (discussed below, p.74 ) of manipu-
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lative tactics and clever circumventions of the bar
against racial and gender discrimination, the insti-
tutional costs of peremptory strikes "outweigh any
of its most highly-touted benefits. 3
The effect of peremptory challenges on dramat-
ically reducing the number of older jurors being
empanelled is unclear, although circumstantial evi-
dence indicates that systematic and widespread dis-
crimination against elders is occurring. Before con-
clusions about the effect of peremptory challenges
on the right of elders to participate in judicial
process by serving on a jury can be drawn, howev-
er, more research is required. The first step to a
more comprehensive understanding of the problem
is a review of the peremptory challenge and its
place in American jurisprudence.
Peremptory Challenges: A Historical
Perspective
The peremptory challenge has been a part of the
American jury system for about two centuries.36
Though widely employed throughout the United
States, "th[e] Court has repeatedly stated that the
right of peremptory challenge is not of constitu-
tional magnitude."37 Peremptory challenges have
no constitutional basis of protection, and the orig-
inal framers of the Constitution contemplated no
discussion of their use. The topic of juror chal-
lenges was not broached until 1791 when the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was drafted.
Even then, the debate was limited to discourse
regarding challenges for cause.3" As American fed-
eral courts began effectuating peremptory chal-
lenges in the 1700s, states followed suit and, by
1790, most states enacted statutes giving defen-
dants and prosecutors the right to peremptory
strikes. Many state courts expressed the view that
the prosecution was entitled to peremptory strikes
based on English common law. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has called it "one of the most
important rights in our justice system."39
Some argue that the inherent tendency of
peremptory challenges to compromise the integrity
of the jury process by permitting exclusion based
upon improper considerations of race ought to lead
to their outright ban in the criminal justice system.
Others praise the peremptory challenge as a device
that lends itself to securing fairness and impartiali-
ty.40 Regardless of the view taken of the value of the
peremptory challenge to the justice system, it is
apparent that such challenges are chiefly based
upon judgments made by prosecutors, plaintiffs'
attorneys, and defense attorneys who possess only
very limited information about the individuals who
are subject to the challenge. Additionally, it seems
clear that a particular juror's right to participate in
the judicial system (sometimes viewed as a civic
duty, or an opportunity to contribute to the demo-
cratic process, depending on one's perspective) is
not a chief consideration.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,4' a jury convicted
a black man of murder. According to state law,
only white males over the age of 21 were eligible
to serve as jurors.42 The U.S. Supreme Court found
that excluding African-Americans from the venire,
which resulted systematically from their ineligibil-
ity to serve as jurors, violated the defendant's
rights as secured under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 3 The Court
also observed that "[t]he very fact that colored
people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right to participate in the administration
of the law, as jurors ... is practically a brand upon
them... an impediment to securing to individuals of
the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others."4 While the decision clearly
focuses on the rights of the accused, this statement
is an early and positive recognition that the
prospective juror also possesses interests in the
jury selection process.
The Strauder decision demonstrated that the
Equal Protection Clause would not tolerate the
exclusion of blacks from the jury venire.
However, the Court emphasized that a defendant
enjoys no right to a petit jury in which his race is
represented. 4 It also established a precedent which
would be seized upon by later courts seeking to
eradicate discrimination from the procedures used
to select the venire from which jurors are drawn.47
In Swain v. Alabama,4 a black man charged
with and convicted of rape moved to quash the
indictment, to strike the venire, and to declare the
petit jury chosen in his case void on the basis that
the jury process was compromised by invidious dis-
crimination. Specifically, the defendant claimed
that the process by which jurors were selected for
participation on the grand jury and petit venire, as
well as the manner in which peremptory challenges
were employed by the state, discriminated against
his race.4 9 The U.S. Supreme Court determined that
a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a
particular case could not establish a prima facie
74 Elder's Advisor
case of purposeful discrimination. However, sys-
tematic discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges over a period of time might establish an evi-
dentiary burden upon the defendant to show pur-
poseful discrimination in the selection of the grand
jury or petit jury venire.5s This would change in the
landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky."1
In Batson, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the
procedural requirements for articulating a claim
for violation of the Equal Protection Clause
through use of peremptory challenges against
potential members of the petit jury. 2 The Court
reaffirmed the principle that the Equal Protection
Clause does not guarantee a defendant the right to
a petit jury composed of members of his own race,
but reiterated that it does guarantee a selection
process free from purposeful discrimination on
account of race. 3 The Court observed that cases
after Swain demonstrated that the burden upon a
defendant of showing discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges over a series of cases had
become a crippling one. 4 Under the procedure
articulated in Batson, a defendant's prima facie
case could be established by showing that:55
1. the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial
group;
2. the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
exclude members of that racial group; and
3. other facts and circumstances exist which give
rise to the inference that the peremptory chal-
lenge was used for improper, racially motivated
reasons.
To rebut a defendant's prima facie case, the state
must come forward with a racially neutral expla-
nation for its conduct; and merely denying racial
motivation will not suffice. 6
The majority's decision in Batson was criticized
as a total abandonment of the peremptory chal-
lenge, which by definition is not peremptory if it
must be scrutinized and justified.-7 Chief Justice
Burger also found the majority Equal Protection
analysis odd because it seemed to apply only when
the specter of racial discrimination was raised,
when, in his view, conventional Equal Protection
principles should extend to challenges premised
upon such factors as gender, religious affiliation,
mental capacity, number of children, choice of liv-
ing arrangements, or employment. 8 The Chief
Justice's insight would prove keen.
Since Batson, the Court accepted opportunities
to extend the application of its holding. 9 These
holdings suggest the full scope and breadth of the
Batson decision have yet to be realized.
The Peremptory Challenge and Elders
Elders are not viewed as a suspect class. That is,
they are not considered a discrete and insular group
in need of protection from a majoritarian political
process. 0 The question arises, then, whether one
litigant may peremptorily challenge an older mem-
ber of the petit jury venire based upon nothing
except preconceived notions about elders and their
biases. Put another way, if challenged by a criminal
defendant, may a prosecutor answer: "I did not
strike the juror because she is a woman; I struck
her because she is an old woman."
In Strauder, Justice Strong observed that
"defendant[s] have the right to be tried by a jury
whose members are selected pursuant to non-dis-
criminatory criteria."" Since Strauder, the Court
has "repeatedly affirmed [its] commitment to jury
selection procedures which are nondiscriminato-
ry."62 "Prospective jurors and litigants alike are
entitled to a jury selection process untainted by
stereotypes and historical prejudices."63 If so, it
would seem to follow that the condition of
advanced age cannot constitutionally serve as a
"proxy for juror competence and impartiality."64
In J.E.B. v. Alabama,6s the state filed a com-
plaint on behalf of a mother relating to paternity
and child support. The state employed all of its
peremptory strikes to exclude males. In holding
that such gender-based uses of peremptory chal-
lenges may violate the Equal Protection Clause, the
U.S. Supreme Court looked to its holding in Taylor
v. Louisiana6 where it struck legislation preventing
a woman from being drawn for jury service unless
she filed a written expression of her desire to serve
as a juror with the clerk of court. According to
Taylor, the scheme violated a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury drawn from a fair
cross section of the community.67 The Taylor deci-
sion also mentioned that juries should maintain a
representative character so as to allow individuals
to share civic responsibility in the administration of
justice. 68 The J.E.B. Court found the statements of
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Taylor consistent with "the heightened equal pro-
tection afforded gender-based classifications." 69
The Court subjected the state's conduct to height-
ened scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, and deter-
mined that gender-based peremptory challenges are
not related to an important government objective.7 °
The state essentially argued that its justification
was that men might be more sympathetic to anoth-
er man under the circumstances, but the Court
refused to "accept as a defense of gender-based
peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law
condemns." 7'
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in J.E.B.,
which was intended to discuss some of "the costs"
of the J.E.B. holding, is significant.72 According to
O'Connor, J.E.B. should be limited to gender-based
discrimination, and as Chief Judge Burger articu-
lated in his Batson dissent, O'Connor acknowl-
edges and lends support to the reality that peremp-
tory challenges allow lawyers to act upon stereo-
types without saying so." She states that, "discrim-
inatory use of the peremptory challenge, in effect,
is a special rule of relevance, a statement about
what this Nation stands for, rather than a state-
ment of fact."7 In essence, Justice O'Connor
argues that race and gender-based discrimination in
jury selection is to be avoided because this nation
publicly stands against such discrimination, not
because such discrimination is, wherever exercised,
utterly without justification.7"
Using jurisprudential models discussed with
regard to race and gender-based discrimination in
the jury selection process, arguably age-based dis-
crimination against elders is subject to at least three
possible constitutional challenges:
1. when it systematically affects the composition
of the petit jury venire, it is subject to scrutiny
under the Sixth Amendment (at least where the
challenge is raised by a criminal defendant);
2. under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, when it purposefully
impacts the composition of the petit jury
through use of the peremptory challenge; and
3. under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to the extent the opportunity to
serve on a jury may be viewed as a fundamental
right.
Concerning a Sixth Amendment challenge, in
Barber v. Ponte,76 there is a comprehensive review
of the implications of a compression of the Sixth
Amendment into the Equal Protection clause.
"This they do in the face of the Supreme Court's
long-standing and consistent position that the two
are not congruent. ' 77 Sixth Amendment claims are
limited to defendants seeking relief from convic-
tions by claiming that the jury, which is constitu-
tionally mandated to reflect a cross section of the
community, was in fact unrepresentative and par-
tial. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphatically
asserted that "enforcement of the Sixth
Amendment cross-section requirement is not con-
fined to enforcement of the Equal Protection
Clause." 7' For purposes of this discussion, the focus
will remain on cases in which a defendant appealed
a judgment, claiming that a specific age group was
purposefully or systematically eliminated from the
venire. As a result, the defendant asserts the jury
was unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered
protection by allowing any defendant to challenge
the arbitrary exclusion of his or her own (or any
other) class, but this raises the rather complex
question of what constitutes a class. In 1970, the
Court explained that a cross section should mirror
a community in such a way that "the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine, that is, of his neighbors,
associates, persons having the same legal status in
society as that which he holds," are included and
well-represented on the jury.79 However, as indicat-
ed in Barber, the defendant has several hurdles yet
to clear before a Sixth Amendment violation will be
considered."
Merely establishing that a "statistical disparity
existed in the chosen age group" of jurors is insuf-
ficient evidence for a prima facie violation of the
Sixth Amendment.
[The] first step in such a claim is establish-
ing the demarcation of a 'distinctive group'
. . . which requires: (1) that the group be
defined and limited by some clearly identifi-
able factor..., (2) that a common thread or
basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experi-
ence run through the group, and (3) that
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there be a community interest among the
members of the group, such that the group's
interests cannot be adequately represented
if the group is excluded from the jury
process."'
Demonstrating that age was a distinctive class
proved difficult not only for the defendant in
Barber, but for countless defendants in every cir-
cuit in the country who similarly tried, and failed,
to adequately argue the distinctiveness of certain
age groups.
Several courts note that if age groups were held
to have distinct characteristics, then the floodgates
would open, thus permitting groups like "blue col-
lar workers, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an end-
less variety of other classifications [to be treated as
"distinct groups"] ... [t]hese are not the groups the
Court has traditionally sought to protect from
under-representation on jury venires."82 However,
for purposes of exempting or challenging jurors on
the basis of age, legislators, attorneys, and judges
often treat older people as a homogeneous group.
Nevertheless, "in the context of challenges to the
under representation of older people (or, in the case
of Barber, younger people) on jury panels, courts
tend to emphasize the diversity of the elder popula-
tion and the arbitrariness of age-based cate-
gories." 3
In Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
notion that women's "distinctive role in society,"
which ostensibly formed the basis of a Louisiana
law excluding them from compulsory jury service,
superseded the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community.84 The Court accepted that women are a
distinct enough group to be part of the cross sec-
tion of the community the participation of which in
the jury system is owed a defendant under the Sixth
Amendment, but disagreed with the Louisiana leg-
islature as to the characteristics that render women
a distinct group." In reality, the Court recognized
women as an identifiable segment of the communi-
ty without much discussion as to what makes them
identifiable. Nevertheless, it is clear that women's
perceived role as "the center of home and family
life" did not set the Court's line of demarcation.86 It
can be argued that the Taylor line of demarcation
rests on an unstated premise, articulated in J.E.B.
That is, women share in common the experience of
being subjects of "invidious, archaic, and over
broad stereotypes."87 Then again, according to
J.E.B., so do men, as the prejudices are about gen-
der. So, at bottom, the line of demarcation is where
one should expect to find it-with the difference
that makes a difference.
Similarly, it cannot seriously be questioned that
elders are usually viewed as a distinct and identifi-
able segment of the community because they are
recognized upon sight and prone to differential
treatment. And yet it cannot be denied that in con-
temporary American culture, older people are often
viewed not merely as old but, furthermore, as fee-
ble, forgetful, close-minded, and bigoted (raised
apart as they were from modern views about race,
gender, religious affiliation, etc.). In short, elders
are stereotyped, and these stereotypes form the
basis of laws that can exclude them from petit jury
venire. Protection under the Sixth Amendment is
intended to offer criminal defendants the opportu-
nity to be judged by the full spectrum of human
experience, requiring all age groups to be reflected
on the jury panel.
The difficulties of challenging age-based or
elder-based discrimination with regard to the use of
peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is somewhat
more problematic because elders have (rightly or
wrongly) not been defined as a protected class.88
Thus, challenging age-based discrimination in jury
selection under this clause most likely would
require determining that older adults are an insular
group, as blacks and women have been.
Under the equal protection clause, defendants
(in criminal cases) and opposing litigants (in civil
cases) have standing to object to unconstitutional
exclusions of jurors through peremptory chal-
lenges.
[A] litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a
third party if the litigant can demonstrate
that he or she has suffered a concrete,
redressable injury, that he or she has a close
relation with the third party, and that there
exists some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests. 9
So far, there has not been a case of an excluded
juror claiming that their equal protection rights
were violated because they were stricken from a
jury panel. Although there is no bar to such an
action, the U.S. Supreme Court notes that "[t]he
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barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunt-
ing."9" Thus, a Court decision on the constitution-
ality of age-based peremptory challenges likely will
be in the hands of third parties, not the older jurors
themselves.
Finally, the right to participate in the justice
system and to serve on a jury may be viewed as a
fundamental right"' under the Due Process clause of
the 14th Amendment. Thus, the stricken juror
potentially would have standing to challenge the
peremptory strike on that basis. Compare the right
to serve on a jury with the right to vote,"2 which is
an established fundamental right. If participating in
the justice system through service in the jury system
is a fundamental right, then only government in the
presence of a compelling interest requiring review
using strict scrutiny can interfere with this right.
Since it is widely acknowledged that the interest in
preserving the peremptory challenge is not of con-
stitutional magnitude and that using such chal-
lenges may be based on nothing more than intu-
ition and hunches at best, and biases or prejudice at
worst, arguably the peremptory challenge cannot
survive a strict scrutiny analysis. Therefore, an
older juror may have standing to challenge age-
based removal from the venire, claiming a violation
of a fundamental right, thus requiring the attorney
(the state actor) to demonstrate that the strike
served a compelling state interest. Review of
peremptory challenges using a strict scrutiny analy-
sis would effectuate perhaps the strongest basis for
arguing their unconstitutionality.
Conclusion
Many aspects of an older person's interaction with
the jury system require further critical assessment.
In particular, greater attention should be directed
to the use of exemptions and exclusions for older
citizens summoned for jury service; the practice of
peremptorily striking older potential jurors based
solely upon their age; the perceptions older people
have about the judicial process; and the perceptions
held by actors in the justice system about older
people. The fact that, in the peremptory challenge
phase, courts accept lawyers' justifications for
striking a juror based solely on that individual's age
is cause for serious concern. Older people may
become tentative, ambivalent, and untrusting of
the process if they perceive that they are being
stereotyped and discarded.
Further, the implications of age-based discrimi-
nation for the rights of the accused in Sixth
Amendment situations and, perhaps more interest-
ingly, the fundamental rights of older citizens being
excluded from jury panels under Due Process,
merit closer examination by the courts. As the pop-
ulation of older people increases, there should be
more systematic analysis of their needs and rights
in the judicial branch. Very little assessment has
been done to identify factors that discourage elders'
participation, but anecdotal evidence indicates that
entrenched stereotypes about older people actually
may work to drive discriminatory laws, policies,
and practices that keep older people from ever
reaching a jury panel.
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